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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: 
THE CASE OF TREE CROPS IN WEST AFRICA 
By Sara Berry 
The spread of tree crop production in West Africa introduced a 
potentially significant force for privatization of rural rights in land. Tree crops 
are generally considered to be the personal property of the individual who plants 
them. Planters control output of tree crop farms and may also alienate the trees -
by lease, gift, mortgage, or sale. In principle rights in trees do not extend to the 
land on which they are planted, but in practice transfers of trees by sale or 
pledge have come to be treated as transfers of rights in land as well (Berry, 1975; 
Gastellu, 1980; Hill, 1963; Lloyd, 1962). Since tree crops were developed for their 
commercial value, increased planting led to the growth of a market in trees 
themselves. The resulting commercialization of rural assets, together with 
individual ownership of trees, have been taken to mean that the spread of tree 
crop cultivation has acted as an impetus towards privatization of rural land 
rights (Kobben, 1963; Biebuyck, 1963). 
At the same time, there are several mechanisms of acquiring rights in tree 
crops which do not extinguish previously existing rights and which therefore 
lead to the multiplication of rights (and right-holders). in individual farms. 
Inheritance, tenancy and some labor arrangements often create multiple rights in 
tree crop farms and, in so doing, work against privatisation. Over time, the 
actual pattern of control over tree crops and their proceeds has depended not so 
much on the formal rules of access and transfer as on interactions among 
potential right holders. Individuals' access to tree crop farms has depended more 
on their ability to exercise their claims vis a vis those of other rightholders, than 
on the way in which they acquired their rights in the first place ( cf. Hill, 1963:112). 
Both in acquiring rights over trees, and in exercising and defending them 
vis-a-vis other claimants, West Africans have drawn on a variety of multi-
stranded social relationships, including descent, marriage, ethnicity, and patron-
client ties. The development of tree crop cultivation promoted rural 
commercialization and created a category of individually owned assets, but did 
not lead unambiguously to privatization or the emergence of a class of capitalist 
farmers. Instead, both the definition and enforcement of property rights in tree 
crop economies, and associated patterns of rural accumulation and 
differentiation, have been mediated through pre-existing social relations which 
have shaped, as well as reflected changing patterns of access to and control over 
productive resources. 
In the following pages I develop this argument as follows. First I 
describe and illustrate processes whereby rights in farms have proliferated over 
time. Then I trace changing patterns of rights in tree crop farms for two socially 
defined categories of people - viz., women and sharecroppers - in order to 
illustrate the ways in which social relations have influenced the construction of 
property rights and patterns of differential access to rural assets. I conclude with 
2 
some comments on the implications of changing rights in tree crop farms for the 
conceptualization of rural property rights and their influence on patterns of 
agricultural development and rural differentiation in West Africa. 
The Proliferation of Rights in Farms 
The principle that trees belong exclusively to the individual who plants 
them suggests that, other things being equal, tree crops are private property. 
However, other things are not equal. For one thing, most planters have 
employed other people's labor at some stage in the life cycle of their farms, and 
labor has often been recruited through pre-existing, multi-stranded social 
relations. Also, since economic trees (cocoa, coffee and kola especially). usually 
live and bear fruit for a number of years, most tree crop farms are eventually 
inherited - a process which often adds new claimants to the roster of persons 
with interests in a given farm. Both labor arrangements and inheritance practices 
have worked to create multiple, overlapping rights in particular farms, and to 
multiply the number of right-holders with potential claims to the proceeds of a 
farm or the power to transfer rights therein to other people. These proliferation 
of rights in farms has also been reinforced by migration and by the transmission 
of information concerning farm histories in the settlement of disputed claims. 
Inheritance. Throughout the humid zone of West Africa, inheritance 
rules and practices involve the devolution of property to groups of people 
creating "a drift towards lineage property" (Hill, 1963:115). In patrilineal descent 
systems, a man's property is often inherited jointly by his children, or the 
children of each wife. In matrilineal Akan communities, a man's property passes 
to a single heir, but the heir is chosen by the decedent's matrilineal kin (abusua). 
and is supposed to administer the property for the benefit of the abusua, not 
"failing to pay due regard to the needs of the sons (and widows). of the deceased:' 
(Hill, 1963:113). As farms become the property of groups of heirs, transfers from 
one individual to another (through mortgage, gift, or sale). may be challenged on 
the grounds that the person who alienated the farm did not exercise exclusive 
rights over it to begin with. (Okali, 1983; Berry, 1975; Gastellu, 1980). Thus, even 
outright sales of tree crop farms do not necessarily create private property: "toute 
partie du terrain vendue a son tour par le detenteur du titre fancier sera reclamee 
par !es heritiers a son deces ... " (Weber, 1977: 132). 
Labor. The principle that trees belong to the person who plants them has 
been extended to include persons other than the original planter who have 
worked on the farm. By "investing" their labor in a farm, it is argued, people 
may build up an interest in it over time - especially if they were not fully 
compensated for their labor at the time it was performed (Berry, 1975, 1985; Okali, 
1983; Robertson, 1983). Such arguments are most likely to be advanced with 
respect to persons who have worked on a particular farm over a period of years -
such as wives, junior kin, or sharecroppers. In principle, claims based on labor do 
not supercede those of the planter or his/her heirs, but coexist with them; hence, 
they serve to multiply interests in and claimants to individual farms. 
Oral history. Another mechanism through which claims on a farm may 
multiply over time is the actual transmission and interpretation of information 
about past transactions. In the past, written records of transfers of rights in farms 
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were scarce, and documents recording the act of planting itself virtually non-
existent. Thus, when disputes arose, settlements were likely to be based more on 
the reputations of available witnesses than on the "facts" of prior transactions ( cf. 
Parkin, 1972). Moreover, as the claims acquired through the investment of labor 
or inheritance were rarely spelled out (in terms of amount or timing), they have 
been subject to multiple and conflicting interpretations. 
Migration. Reinterpretation of rights to tree crops has been common in 
areas with large numbers of migrant farmers, where disputes often arose over the 
respective rights of indigenous land holders and immigrant planters. The 
importance of migration in the development of tree crop production was first 
demonstrated for southern Ghana by Polly Hill (1963), and subsequently 
documented in other areas as well (Berry, 1975; Chauveau and Richard, 1977; 
Dupire, 1960; Kobben, 1956; Olusanya, et al., 1978). Migrant farmers usually 
obtained rights to cultivate tree crops in exchange for annual payments which 
attest to the landowners' continuing interest in the land itself. The resulting 
overlap of rights to tree crops and the land they stand on has, in turn, given rise 
to conflicting claims to the income from tree crop farms, or the right to alienate 
the trees themselves. For example, sales of land have sometimes been 
reinterpreted as customary tenancies, and the ownership of farms has been 
disputed by the descendants of both landowners and tree crop planters (Berry, 
1975; Dupire, 1960; Gastellu, 1981/2; Kobben, 1963; Okali, 1983; Weber, 1977). In 
other words, the presence of large numbers of migrant farmers in the tree crop 
zone has reinforced the tendency for tree farms to "accumulate;' claims over time. 
The proliferation of rights and interests in tree crop farms means not 
only that access to and control over tree crop farms is often contested, but also 
that the outcome of such contests depends on processes of negotiation, 
ajudication, or conflict among the interested parties. Because particular rights 
are usually not precisely specified, disputes are rarely settled on legal grounds 
alone, but also according to the abilities of rival claimants to influence the 
settlement process. This ability rests, in turn, on social relations and processes not 
directly tied to tree crop production per se. In the following sections, I will 
illustrate this point by discussing changing rights in tree crop farms for two 
categories of people: women and sharecroppers. 
, Women's "Under-investment" in Tree Crop Farms 
For the most part, rural women in West Africa have participated in tree 
crop cultivation by working on farms owned and/or managed by men, rather 
than by planting and acquiring farms of their own. In Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and 
Cameroon, both the proportion of rural women who own tree crops, and the 
proportion of tree-crop farmers who are women are relatively low (Berry, 1975; 
Chauveau, 1979; Chauveau & Richard, 1977; Galletti, et al, 1956; Gastellu, 1984; 
Guyer, 1984b; Weber, 1977). The chief exception is. in areas of Ghana where 
descent is reckoned matrilineally, and tree crops were grown primarily by local, 
as opposed to migrant farmers. In some communities, 50 percent or more of the 
resident women own tree crops (Beckett, 1944; Hill, 1963; Okali, 1983; Mikell, 1984; 
Vellenga, 1977). In surveys of two villages - one in Asante and one in Ahafo -
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Okali (1983:58) found that 44 percent of the cocoa farmers were women, many of 
them locally born, who had planted cocoa for themselves on land belonging to 
their own descent group. Indeed, male strangers to Ahafo sometimes gained 
access to land by marrying local women. Since a male stranger's access to land is 
contingent on good relations with their affines - who also stand to inherit his 
farms - "it is presumed that he cultivates for the benefit of his children" (Okali, 
1983:62). Even among the matrilineal Akan, however, men own over half the 
acreage under tree crops, and women's holdings are smaller, on the average, than 
men's (Hill, 1975; Mikell, 1984; Okali, 1983). 
Moreover, in Akan communities where large numbers of women have 
established and/or acquired tree crop farms in the past, there is evidence that the 
incidence of female ownership has declined over time. In the Sunyani district of 
Ghana, Mikell (1984:206) found that women had stopped acquiring farms after the 
1940s; that the proportion of total cocoa output and income produced on women's 
farms had declined over time; and that - despite many women's expressed desire 
to bequeath their farms to their daughters - when female farm owners died, their 
farms usually passed to the control of men. In Akokoaso, rates of female farm 
ownership were somewhat lower in the 1970s than those recorded by Beckett 
(1944) forty years earlier (Okali, 1983). 
The low or declining rate of women's ownership of tree crop farms is not 
the inevitable consequence of jural discrimination against women with respect to 
property rights. West African women participate extensively in rural production 
and exchange throughout the region. Even if, in some societies, marriage and 
kinship rules have made it difficult for women to acquire the right to plant 
permanent crops on land controlled by descent groups or communities, a great 
many rural women have opportunities to earn cash income which they control 
independently of their husbands or male kin. Since tree crops have become one 
of the principal income-generating assets available to rural people with modest 
incomes, one would expect a substantial number of women to have invested part 
of their savings in bearing trees. That they have apparently not done so is the 
result of several factors which have combined to restrict women's ability to 
commute jurally recognized claims to tree crop farms into effective control of 
the trees or their fruit. These factors include explicit restrictions on women's 
access to the right to plant permanent crops; limitations on women's ability to 
mobilize labor (both other people's and their own). for tree crop farming; and 
women's inability to assert their claims vis a vis those of men in cases of disputed 
rights to particular farms. 
In the early stages of tree crop development, many women found it 
difficult to obtain rights to plant permanent crops on land controlled by the male 
members of their own or their husbands' descent groups. In an Ewe community 
in eastern Ghana, for example, Bukh (1979) found that women who farmed on 
their fathers' land were not allowed to plant tree crops because these would be 
inherited by their children and thus lost to the woman's lineage. Elsewhere, 
women have sometimes been explicitly prohibited from planting tree crops 
(Weber, 1977; cf. Galletti et al, 1956:127; Gastellu, 1984). 
More often, women were precluded from planting tree crops for 
themselves by the terms on which they participated in the rural economy as a 
whole. Also, women have rarely migrated to new farming areas on their own, but 
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tend to follow their husbands and assist on the husbands' farms. In Brong Ahafo, 
migrant women found that "as strangers their cultivation rights were restricted, 
[ and] they were unable to establish themselves even as subsistence producers on 
their own since in this capacity they would be unable to pay for the land. They 
therefore continued in the only way possible, on their husbands' farms." (Okali, 
1983:97). Hill (1963:116) reported that "it is unusual for a woman to be a member of 
a company in her own right," although women were sometimes left in charge of 
their husbands' farms while the men "were travelling about managing the work 
on their various lands" (ibid.:117). 
Thousands of Yoruba women also "followed their husbands" in migrating 
to the forest belt to plant cocoa, assisting on their husbands' farms until the 
young trees were mature enough to support the cost of hired laborers. Like Akan 
wives, Yoruba women frequently assumed responsibility for managing mature 
farms when their husbands established new farms or other enterprises elsewhere 
(Berry, 1985; Olusanya et al, 1978. Cf. Boutillier et al., 1977; Chauveau, 1979). 
In general, women found it difficult to mobilize labor - their own as well 
as other people's - for tree crop cultivation. Often they were simply too busy 
with food crop production and other domestic and productive chores to have 
time for tree crop planting. In female food farming systems, women are often 
responsible for providing most or all of the foodstuffs consumed by members of 
their immediate households, and cannot abandon food crop cultivation to plant 
and tend tree crops unless they have access to alternative sources of income to 
buy food (Guyer, 1984b). In addition, women do most of the domestic work, 
devoting several hours each day to fetching wood and water, cooking, and child 
care - and are often expected to work on their husbands' farms as well. In 
principle, they could hire in labor to cultivate food crops or help with other 
income-generating activities (food processing, trade, crafts), and some women do 
this although those with sufficient working capital to hire in labor can just as 
well hire labor to cultivate tree crops on their behalf as hire in labor to release 
their own time to work on tree crop farms (Galletti et al., 1956; Berry, 1975). 
The majority of West African farmers - male and female - do not have 
sufficient working capital to establish tree crop farms solely with hired-in labor. 
Increased labor hiring has been a conseqence of, rather than a condition for, the 
spread of tree crop cultivation, with income from early maturing farms a 
principal source of working capital for paying hired workers (Berry, 1975; 
Chauveau, 1979; Galletti et al., 1956; Hill, 1956, 1963). For both men and women, it 
has usually been necessary to establish or acquire mature tree crops in order to 
be able to substitute hired for unpaid labor. The difference is that men have 
found it easier to mobilize unpaid labor - usually from subordinate family 
members, including their wives - to establish tree crop farms in the first place. 1 
Husbands' rights to the labor of their wives (and fathers to that of their 
unmarried daughters as well as sons). have meant that women are far more likely 
to work on their husbands' farms than vice versa (Berry, 1975:172££; Dozon, 
1977:479; Galletti et al., 1956:77; Oppong et al, 1975:72). 
1The same is true of food crop production (Guyer, 1980). 
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In some areas, this problem was exacerbated as men withdrew their labor 
from food crop production in order to specialize in the more remunerative 
cultivation of cocoa and coffee (Bukh, 1979; Guyer, 1984b; Weber, 1977). When this 
occurred, the burden of feeding the household was relegated increasingly to 
women, tying up more of their labor in food crop cultivation and prolonging 
their inability to move into tree crop production on their own account. 
Also, in farming systems where both men and women participated in food 
crop production, tree crops proved easier to integrate into men's than into 
women's fields or farming tasks. Tree crops grow best on newly cleared forest 
land. Since heavy clearing is usually men's work, men were often able to plant 
tree crops in direct conjunction with their on-going farming activities (Cleave, 
1974). This technical advantage was especially marked in areas where men took 
full responsibility for initial cultivation of newly cleared forest plots. In 
Cameroon, for example, "the cultivation of cocoa ... fit into Beti ideas about the 
division of labor like a hand into a glove. It was grown in field types which had 
always been associated with male labor . . . . In terms of labor organization, 
establishing a young cocoa farm was almost identical to melon-seed cultivation, 
..• and, like melon-seed, cocoa is a constituent of male wealth" (Guyer, 1984b:52) 
Restrictions on women's ability to mobilize labor for tree crop cultivation 
were partly the result of custom and partly a matter of financial exigency. 
Because their access to the labor of relatives ( other than that of their unmarried 
daughters and young sons). was limited and their responsibilities for the daily 
provisioning of their households substantial, most women could not afford to 
invest in assets, such as tree crops, with a long gestation period. They were 
simply not in a position - socially or economically - to forego current income 
generating activities in order to invest in income streams which would only 
materialize after several years. (Cf. Guyer, 1980; Spiro, 1980.) 
Because of the conditions under which women could mobilize others' 
labor, and demands on their own time associated with the division of labor by 
gender in domestic and local farming systems, in the early stages of tree crop 
cultivation, men planted farms for themselves while women worked on the young 
farms of their husbands or senior agnates. However, this does not explain why 
women with accumulated savings from other occupations did not invest more 
extensively in established tree crops, or why female farm ownership tended to 
decline over time in places such as Sunyani and Akokoaso. To understand the 
low and declining rate of women's investment in tree crops, we must also take 
account of the ways claims on farms were exercised over time. 
Throughout the humid zone of West Africa, the division of agricultural 
and domestic labor is embedded in conjugal and domestic relations. The specific 
division of responsibility for household expenditures varied among local areas 
and even households within one locality. Tree crops created new employment 
opportunities, new demands on people's time and resources, and new flows of 
cash income in rural economies of the humid zone, but people's responses to 
these changes were played out in the context of conjugal and domestic relations. 
Wives' labor on their husbands' farms and the "returns" they expected, 
were rarely expressed as an explicit, single-stranded contract, but tended rather to 
merge with conjugal rights and responsibilities in general. Wives were usually not 
paid for helping on their husbands' farms. Service on their husbands' tree crop 
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farms often originated as an extension of wives' conjugal obligations to 
contribute to household consumption and assist in husbands' farming activities. It 
was expected that husbands, in turn, would contribute to the household budget 
and provide their wives with additional goods or services from time to time, but 
what specific additional claims a wife could make in return for her labor on a 
tree crop farm was rarely articulated. 
Accordingly, the rearrangement of domestic rights and responsibilities 
which followed the spread of tree crop cultivation occurred unevenly, and 
patterns of control over assets and income varied among localities. In western 
Nigeria, for example, wives' claims appear to have been directed towards the 
husband, rather than the farm. I never encountered a court case in which a 
woman claimed a share of her husband's farm because she had worked on it in 
the past. Rather, when the husband's farm matured, wives expected to be 
released from their obligations to help him, leaving them free to develop their 
own, independent sources of income (Berry, 1975, 1985).2 
In Akan communities in Ghana, wives' expectations were focussed more 
directly on the farm. In the Ahafo village studied by Okali, "none of the wives 
assumed that they had established a joint concern with their husbands in [the 
sense] that both had equal rights to it, although they did expect some 
compensation other than the food crops, possibly even a fraction of the 
established farm" (Okali, 1983:103). Okali also cites a number of court cases in 
which a woman advanced claims to all or part of an established tree farm on the 
grounds that she had invested her labor in the farm during her husband's 
lifetime. Although she does not present a large number of decisions handed down 
in such cases, her evidence does not suggest that women amassed much property 
in this way. 
In short, even in societies in which women have been able to invest in 
tree crop farms - through access to planting rights and/or the means to establish 
or acquire bearing trees - it has been difficult for them to maintain control over 
their farms in the long run, or to assert their claims to farms vis a vis those of 
men in the context of open-ended, overlapping, and proliferating rights to rural 
property. 
Sharecroppers 
Much of the labor on tree crop farms in West Africa is performed by 
men, under a wide variety of contractual arrangements. Farmers have often 
relied heavily on the labor of junior or subordinate kinsmen - especially during 
the early years when immature trees do not yield enough to cover the cost of 
hiring in labor to work them, or to release the farmer's time from other tasks for 
tree crop cultivation. Like Yoruba wives, junior men in Yoruba, Baule, Beti, and 
other societies worked for their seniors in exchange for future protection and 
2
Some Yoruba women also received gifts of money to help them start a trade, but among my 
informants, farmers• wives usually obtained such gifts from their agnates rather than their husbands (Berry, 
1985:95). In Ivory Coast, Baule farmers "employed" their wives (and junior kinsmen). in exchange for 
expectations of future support or assistance in establishing independent occupations of their own._ (Dupire, 
1960:128-9; Chauveau, 1979). 
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assistance. Often, this assistance took the form of support while the junior 
kinsman established a farm or other enterprise of his own (Berry, 1975, 1985; 
Chauveau, 1979; Weber, 1977). 
In some areas, male laborers may consider that they have acquired an 
interest in the farm itself by investing their labor in it (Okali, 1983:99). 
Sometimes, laborers expect ( or are considered) to have acquired an interest in the 
farm, even when they were remunerated for their labor at the time it was 
performed. For example, Robertson (1983) argues that in Ghana this was 
sometimes the case with sharecroppers, especially those who have worked on 
particular farms for a number of years. 
Sharecropping is widespread in Ghana and Ivory Coast, where it takes 
several forms. In general, sharecropping derives from the Akan custom of 
presenting a chief or stool-holder with one third (abusa) of any game, minerals, 
or forest produce collected from the territory under their jurisdiction (Dupire, 
1960; Gastellu, 1980. 1981/2; Hill, 1956; Kobben, 1956). As people began to migrate 
into forested areas to plant tree crops, Akan chiefs sometimes granted cultivation 
rights to stranger farmers in exchange for one third of the farm when the trees 
were established.3 Also, some strangers obtained cultivation rights in exchange 
for one third of the annual cocoa crop (Hill, 1956:14). Such farmers were, in 
effect, tenants; their position in the cocoa economy was similar to that of Yoruba 
or Baule tenants who paid a fixed annual amount of cocoa ( or cash). in exchange 
for long-term cultivation rights. Like other tenant farmers, abusa or share 
tenants owned the trees they planted and could dispose of them - by sale, 
mortgage, or bequest (Dupire, 1960:67; Hill, 1956:14). Landowning lineages or 
chiefs sometimes sought to exploit the possibilities of such tenancies, arguing that 
land sales to companies of migrant farmers really involved only sales of long-
term cultivation rights, and that as continuing "owners" of the land, chiefs were 
entitled to one third of its fruits (Gastellu, 1981/2). Gastellu (1980) also describes 
cases of Agni chiefs-turned-planters who in effect "leased" stool lands to 
themselves, claiming one-third of the crop as their traditional chiefly prerogative 
and an additional third as their owner's share of the proceeds of the farm ( cf. 
Kobben, 1956, on the Bete; Weber, 1977, on the Beti). 
Abusa laborers, who weeded and harvested other people's farms in 
exchange for one-third of the crop, were not farm owners. Often referred to in 
the literature and by English-speaking West Africans as "caretakers," they 
performed a variety of tasks. In the 1950s, abusa laborers working for Agni 
farmers in Ivory Coast were expected to spend one day a week helping their 
employer establish a new plot of cocoa and also to clear a plot for food crop 
cultivation at the end of the farming season (Kobben, 1956:87-88). Sometimes abusa 
men supplied their own tools; frequently they were given plots of land on which 
to grow their own food crops while they were attached to a particular tree crop 
farm (Robertson, 1983:467). Like sharecroppers in other parts of the world (and 
farmers' wives in the tree crop economies of Nigeria and Ghana), abusa laborers 
frequently served as farm managers, assuming sole charge of a farm while the 
owner managed additional farms or pursued other occupations elsewhere (Hill, 
3In such cases the stranger often sold his portion of the farm, moving on to establish another farm 
somewhere else with the proceeds (Hill, 1963:15-16). 
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1956, 1963). They sometimes hired in additional labor, or drew on the assistance 
of their wives and children to enable them to sharecrop more or larger farms 
(Hill, 1963:189; Robertson, 1983:467). 
Robertson suggests that sharecropping contracts created a basis for 
laborers to develop rights in land. "In southern Ghana, it is probable that in the 
many instances where the 'caretaker' is a nephew, abusa is a preliminary step 
towards inheritance of the farm . . . . Much the same process may be taking place 
in the many instances where the 'caretaker' is a son. Abusa may provide a 
gradual and unostentatious strategy for patrilateral deposition inter vivos" 
(Robertson, 1983:468). Similarly, abusa contracts between non-kin may lead to 
laborers' acquiring rights in farms over time. Migrants often gained access to 
land in tree crop growing areas by working as abusa laborers. In Ghana, Mossi 
and other migrants entered into abusa contracts with Akan farmers, who also 
gave them land for cultivating food crops. Eventually they managed to settle 
their families in the forest belt and some acquired tree crops of their own 
(Robertson, 1983). In western Nigeria, migrant laborers from the Middle Belt 
rarely planted tree crops, but some established themselves as commercial food 
crop growers in cocoa farming areas, producing for the local market and even 
founding their own villages (Berry, 1975). 
During the rapid colonization of new lands in southwestern Ivory Coast 
after 1960, competition for agricultural labor was intense and farmers recruited 
workers (including non-Ivorians). by promising them assistance in establishing 
tree crop farms of their own (Boutillier et al., 1977; Chauveau, 1979; Schwartz, 
1979). Dupire observed in the late 1950s that abusa laborers stood a better chance 
than daily or task workers of becoming tenant farmers. In old cocoa growing 
areas of Ghana, where farm productivity had declined, farmers sometimes gave 
up their own shares of farm output or granted proprietary rights directly to their 
abusa laborers in order to retain their services in the face of declining returns to 
tree crop cultivation itself (Okali, 1983). In some areas of Ghana, an abusa man's 
tenure could be regarded as heritable or even saleable. Some abusa laborers 
actually received compensation for trees destroyed in the colonial government's 
campaign against swollen shoot disease in the late 1940s (Hill, 1956). 
Sharecroppers are more likely to develop rights in farms if they have 
worked on them for a number of years. However, abusa contracts do not 
invariably mature towards full proprietary rights in farms in the long run. In 
Ghana, as farms planted in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries 
matured, the share of the crop allocated to laborers sometimes declined or abusa 
laborers were replaced altogether by cheaper nkotokuano laborers (Hill, 1963). In 
general, "it is impossible to estimate the proportion of people who 'graduate' 
through an abusa contract to full proprietary interest in the farm" (Robertson, 
1983:469). 
Whether or not former laborers assert claims to tree crop farms often 
appears to depend more on changing economic and political conditions than on 
the original terms of the labor contract. For example, increases in the proportion 
of farms worked by sharecroppers have occurred in periods of labor scarcity, 
which were brought about either by rapid expansion of tree crop planting, as in 
Ivory Coast in the 1960s, or by declining returns to cocoa production and high 
rates of rural outmigration, as in eastern Ghana in the same period. Like long-
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term labor-credit arrangements among agnates or between spouses, abusa 
contracts have been used to recruit and finance farm labor by farmers without 
ready access to working capital. Similarly, sharecroppers may expect future 
assistance from the farm owner in acquiring farms of their own. However, these 
expectations are not formalized: like labor-credit arrangements among kin, they 
resemble the generalized expectations of future support which clients hold of 
their patrons, rather than a futures contract in which amounts and dates of 
future transactions are clearly specified. The ambiguities of such arrangements 
leave them open to re-interpretation as economic conditions change, or social and 
political relations between share tenants and farm owners shift over time. 
Sometimes the ambiguous nature of contractual relations is reflected in local 
terminology. In the cocoa farming areas of southwestern Nigeria, the Yoruba 
term olori oko (lit., owner of the farm) is used to refer both to landholders and to 
tenant farmers (Berry, 1975:95). 
The ambiguity of abusa and other long-term labor-credit arrangements is 
central to understanding differential access to tree crop farms. Robertson 
(1983:471-472) concludes that, in Ghana, "usufruct is very durable, may be bought 
and sold, bequeathed or used as collateral; it cannot however, be resolved into 
black-and-white categories as distinct as 'ownership' and 'non-ownership."' As 
Polly Hill has cogently argued, "any attempt to define proprietary interests in 
such terms is fruitless: it is the degree of individual control which must be 
considered" (1963:112). It is therefore unhelpful to think of abusa as necessarily 
maturing to outright ownership of the land. 
However, if contractual arrangements are subject to multiple 
interpretations - either because of the way they are defined (or left vague), or 
because of the conditions under which they are negotiated and carried out - then 
contracts are at most only partial determinants of social outcomes. Robertson's 
conclusion that abusa contracts have militated "against the polarisation of 
southern Ghanaian society into distinct classes" (1983:473) may overstate the case. 
The indeterminacy of labor contracts means not that they have prevented 
differentiation, but that the long-term implications of labor-credit arrangements 
for patterns of control over rural property are subject to change over time as 
economic conditions change and differentiation occurs. The property rights 
exercised by particular categories of people - e.g., women or sharecroppers -
depend on their socio-political position and relations with other groups in the 
rural economy, as well as on their command over income or their access to the 
means of production per se. 
Property Rights and Resource Management: 
Implications for Rural Development 
So far, I have argued that across the West African forest zone, rights in 
tree crop farms tended to multiply over time. Because of their longevity, most 
tree crops are inherited, and inheritance practices usually foster or create 
multiple claims on property. Further, the ease with which strangers have 
acquired cultivation rights, and labor has been mobilized through non-market 
mechanisms, has also contributed to the proliferation of rights in cultivable land 
and tree crop farms. Taken together, these processes created overlapping rights 
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which have frequently given rise to tension, litigation, and sometimes outright 
conflict. 
The issues arising in such conflicts are complex, in part because the 
individuals involved are often engaged in multiple relations of exchange and 
obligation. As Okali points out, what participants in a given farming enterprise 
expect of one another may depend on several factors: 
Persons who assist in farm development are likely to consider 
that ... they will get some return for their investment ... . 
Returns may be visible in the form of cash, food crops, .. . 
land or other assistance with the establishment of separate 
properties and include ultimately the transfer of ownership of 
the farm itself .... Since returns may not reflect inputs in 
farms but may rather be related to other services received or 
other obligations of the farmers involved, [ resource allocation 
in] cocoa farming [must be] placed within the context of total 
rights and obligations of the actors involved ... (Okali, 1983:99). 
In other words, if a farm owner engages his/her sibling or nephew as an 
abusa or family laborer, it may be difficult to distinguish the farmer's obligations 
to those persons as laborers from his obligations to them as junior kin. Similarly, 
a wife's interest in her husband's farm, which arises from the labor she has 
invested in it over time, may become conflated with her conjugal rights. 
In addition to the ambiguities which surround property rights that are 
embedded in multi-stranded social relationships, the terms of specific contractual 
exchanges are often imprecise. Comaroff's (1980) observation that marriage 
transactions serve to define spheres of ambiguity within which people negotiate 
rights and responsibilities over long periods of time may also be applied to the 
delineation of property rights through inheritance and/or labor-credit relations. 
An abusa contract, for example, may specify clearly what tasks a laborer is to 
perform in exchange for a specific share of the crop, while at the same time the 
terms of a worker's maturing interest in the farm are left vague, subject to 
change with changing economic conditions or shifts in relations of authority and 
obligation between the farmer and farm worker. 
The proliferation of overlapping and open-ended rights in tree crop farms 
has affected patterns of rural investment and rural differentiation in the humid 
zone of West Africa in several ways. First, if social status (gender, marriage, 
seniority) affects a person's ability to acquire or exercise property rights, the rate 
of return to investment in a given type of asset will vary among social groups 
within a given community. Women may have "under-invested" in tree crops 
partly because experience has taught them that they are likely to receive lower 
returns from tree farms than men do. 
Similarly, in a tight rural labor market, sharecroppers may find that farm 
owners are willing to yield them a higher proportion of farm output - or an 
interest in the farm itself - to ensure access to their labor. This has occurred 
both in periods of rural decline and in contexts of rural expansion. In older 
cocoa areas of eastern Ghana, declining yields and rural outmigration in the 1950s 
and '60s made it difficult for farm owners to recruit laborers. To secure labor, 
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many farmers ceded two thirds or even the entire crop to the abusa laborer who 
weeded and harvested the farm (Okali, 1983).4 
In the 1960s and early '70s, a similar problem of excess demand for farm 
labor faced planters in the rapidly expanding tree crop economy of southwestern 
Ivory Coast. Farmers recruited sharecroppers by promising them land (or even 
farms). of their own - a practice which enabled some non-Ivorians to acquire 
farms in defiance of national law (Chauveau, 1979; Schwartz, 1979). 
Second, because social status and social relations help to determine 
people's access to and returns from rural assets, many rural people devote part of 
their savings to establishing or strengthening their social positions, rather than 
investing everything in productive capital. In these circumstances, investment in 
social status is clearly directed toward future profit as well as security - contrary 
to the conventional microeconomic assumption that profit and security are 
mutually exclusive goals (see, e.g., Lipton, 1968; Berry, 1980). Investment in social 
status as a means to strengthen property rights may help to explain a wide array 
of rural expenditures, from weddings to palaces (Berry, 1985; Parkin, 1972). It may 
also help to account for West Africans' widespread preference for relatively 
liquid forms of rural assets and income-generating activities. West African 
women tend to specialize in trade, processing or food crops - rather than 
investing in tree crops, houses, or other assets with long gestation or payoff 
periods. 5 
Finally, the open-ended and overlapping nature of rights in tree crop 
farms means that rural differentiation in tree crop economies arises as much 
from relations of power as from relations of production. As we have seen, 
multiple, open-ended claims to rural property have created spheres within which 
actual patterns of access and control are subject to on-going re-negotiation or 
dispute. Redistribution of income or control over assets themselves can be 
touched off not only by changing economic conditions, but also by political 
processes originating independently of the rural economy. Chiefs have 
sometimes taken advantage of changing political conditions to revive dormant 
rights over land and land users, or to re-define the terms of present land using 
arrangements. In Nigeria, as cocoa prices rose and pressures for local self-
government mounted after 1945, the chiefs of Ife insisted successfully that all 
"non-Ifes" growing cocoa on Ife land must pay an annual fee (isakole) .• to their Ife 
"landlords" - regardless of how long they had lived on Ife soil, or whether they 
had ever paid isakole before (Berry, 1975). This coup affected the division of 
proceeds from hundreds of cocoa farms in Ife, and underscored the non-Ifes' 
status as "strangers" in the Ife area. This served, in turn, to undermine their role 
in local political affairs, and helped to protect the dominance of Ife interests in 
the emerging regional political party system (Berry, 1985; Clarke, 1980; Oyediran, 
1973; Peel, 1983). 
4
Robertson (1983:469) alludes to this, but does not point out that increases in tenants' share of the 
output may reflect changes in rural economic conditions rathern than an inherent tendency for abusa 
tenancies to "mature" towards ownership of farms. 
5
1ndeed, one wonders whether they also eschew land-augmenting investments (such as fences, wells, 
alley crops) - for fear of losing control of the assets before they pay off or can be sold. If so, this could 
contribute to low yields and agricultural stagnation. 
13 
Similarly, in Brong Ahafo, cocoa farming provided not only a source of 
revenue for various levels of local and national government, but also an arena 
wherein local political factions struggled for potential advantage at the national 
level by manipulating the terms of control over rural property, produce, and the 
loyalties of rural producers (Dunn and Robertson, 1973). In Ivory Coast, the 
government's effort to simplify land tenure and reward agricultural enterprise by 
abolishing customary tenures and declaring a policy of "land to the tiller" left 
open the question of allocating cultivation rights in unoccupied areas. As rising 
prices for cocoa and coffee touched off a scramble for uncultivated land in the 
southwest, strangers sometimes constituted themselves "chiefs," allocating use 
rights to latecomers ( often in exchange for labor) on land which they themselves 
had occupied only shortly before (Schwartz, 1979:99). 
Across the humid zone of West Africa, then, the spread of tree crop 
cultivation led to the commercialization of various rights in rural property, but 
not to their consolidation into forms of exclusive control over land or trees. 
What Polly Hill so aptly denominated "the degree of individual control'' over tree 
crop farms remained subject to redefinition - among kin, through the courts, and 
through local and national political processes. In all these arenas, the outcome of 
conflict over rights in tree crop farms depended on the political as well as the 
economic resources of the contestants, and on their relative successes in 
deploying these resources to acquire and defend rights in rural property. 
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